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The Possibility of Philosophical Anthropology1 
Can a conception of human nature still be possible in light of the “post-
metaphysical sensibilities” of our time? Moreover, can philosophy make any 
contribution towards the articulation of a tenable philosophical anthropol-
ogy given such sensibilities?2 After taking into account (in section I) an un-
derstandable skepticism about the possibility or even desirability of any 
affirmative answer to these questions, I will argue that we can respect the 
motivations underlying this sort of skepticism without abandoning the en-
terprise of philosophical anthropology as such (in sections II and III). Doing 
so must involve, in my view, the reconception both of the status of what 
features or aspects of being human should belong to a philosophical anthro-
pology and a better understanding of what it is we are doing when we articu-
late such an anthropology. Although many philosophers have had a lot to say 
about human nature, they have not been in my view as reflective as they 
should be about what entitles us to believe that we can acquire knowledge or 
understanding of human nature at all.3 I shall argue, therefore, that we must 
get clearer about latter issue before we try to work out any philosophical 
anthropology.  
Given the space constraints of this essay, I cannot obviously provide an a 
complete philosophical anthropology as I conceive it, but choose instead to 
 
1  I wish to thank Julie Zahle, Endre Begby, Robin Celikates, Werner Kogge, John 
McDowell, James Peterman, and especially Georg W. Bertram, for helpful comments 
and suggestions on previous versions of this paper. 
2  Note that I use the label “philosophical anthropology” in a broad sense as simply 
synonymous with the idea of a philosophical conception of human nature in general. 
Although there are no doubt some areas of common interest and overlap, I am not re-
ferring specifically in using this label to the line of thought that connects certain 20th 
century German thinkers such as Max Scheler, Helmut Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, and 
Ernst Cassirer, who are regarded as the central figures of the German tradition of phi-
losophical anthropology. For an excellent and critical overview of this tradition, see 
Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, Social Action and Human Nature (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge UP, 1988), ch. 2. For a good discussion of what philosophical anthropology 
could be, see Richard Schacht, “Philosophical Anthropology: What, Why, and How”, 
in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1990), Supplement, pp. 155-176. 
3  Rousseau is one of the first to reflect seriously upon these issues; see esp. Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1971). 
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focus on what I regard as at least one of its necessary aspects, namely, the 
ability to use language. Just as important, I choose this particular aspect be-
cause I believe that it illustrates perspicuously what sort of argument one 
should give in order to show that some feature or capacity is a necessary 
aspect of any philosophical anthropology. For I will suggest that working out 
such an anthropology cannot help but involve the use of “transcendental 
arguments”. But when philosophers use such arguments, I shall urge that 
they should repudiate a common but damaging assumption that such argu-
ments must be committed to a hyper-strong conception of the subject. My 
aim in this paper, then, is not only to do a little philosophical anthropology, 
but also to explain why philosophers must use transcendental arguments as 
the right way to articulate and justify a tenable philosophical anthropology. 
I 
How do our postmetaphysical sensibilities complicate the enterprise of doing 
philosophical anthropology? By “postmetaphysical sensibilities” I refer sim-
ply to our contemporary intellectual climate in which philosophy, at least 
since the advent of the Scientific Revolution in the seventeenth century, can 
no longer derive determinate knowledge about the fundamental nature of 
reality (including human nature) from putatively self-justifying a priori first 
principles.4 Contemporary philosophy can no longer simply stand sovereign 
over the empirical-experimental natural and social sciences and assess “from 
its armchair” the legitimacy of their knowledge claims. Rather, one of its 
primary services has come to consist in making explicit and assessing the 
various ambiguities, presuppositions, implications, contradictions, etc., that 
inform the theories and practices of the empirical-experimental sciences. 
More ambitiously, it can also try its best to bring such assessments into con-
nection with our need to understand and improve our individual and collec-
tive human flourishing. In any case, as far as contemporary philosophy is 
concerned, finding ourselves with postmetaphysical sensibilities means, at 
the very least, abandoning the dream of acquiring metaphysical knowledge as 
derived from supposedly self-justifying a priori first principles.  
 
4  Cf. Jürgen Habermas, Nachmetaphysisches Denken (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1988), 
pp. 35-60. 
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As a general tendency, postmetaphysical thinkers urge us to reject any 
commitment to essentialism, i.e., to static ways of understanding things that 
assume that the features or characteristics of our objects of understanding 
instantiate fixed atemporal essences. Furthermore, they also reject the de-
mand that our understanding of things can ever be value-free or apolitical. 
They argue instead that all understanding and explanation of reality and of 
ourselves presuppose as well as implicate certain power relations and the 
political structures that sustain such relations. In short, anti-essentialists take 
the significance of postmetaphysical thinking to mean that we ought to 
accept and even to embrace the way in which reason is radically contingent: 
Reason is historically and culturally situated, linguistically conditioned, 
embodied and sustained through complexes of practices, and implicated, 
whether consciously or not, in determinate constellations of power relations 
and political structures.5  
Now, why is it important to situate the idea of a conception of human 
nature in this intellectual space? The reason has to do with the problems that 
plague both naturalistic investigations of human nature and anti-essentialist 
reactions to them. In light of the influence of evolutionary theory and its 
connection with current research on the genetic basis of the human species, 
naturalists believe that the biological sciences provide the key to adequately 
understanding human nature. Two recent and controversial scientific re-
search programs that investigate human nature in this vein are sociobiology 
and evolutionary psychology.6 These research programs tend to envisage a 
reductionist conception of human nature, for they claim that most if not all 
basic aspects of being human can be explained without remainder in terms 
of evolutionary theory in connection with the genetic basis of the human 
species. 
This is not the place to evaluate the plausibility and explanatory power of 
this strong claim. What is relevant for our purposes here is that a common 
criticism of such programs is that they fail to take into account not only the 
capacity of human beings to be influenced by their sociocultural environ-
 
5  These are central themes in the work of Michel Foucault; see esp. Les Mots et les Choses 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1990), esp. ch. 9-10 with regard to the topic of human nature and 
its investigation.  
6 Cf. Edmund O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge/MA: Harvard UP, 1978); 
Steven Scher/Frederick Rauscher (eds.), Evolutionary Psychology (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
2003). 
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ment, but also to act for reasons that cannot be reduced to explanations 
couched in terms of natural or sexual selection.7 The charge is that the pro-
ponents of these programs fail to take seriously the extent to which human 
beings are reflective creatures who can deliberate about what they should 
think and do. This fact about human beings, at least prima facie, presents 
considerable obstacles for reductionistic scientific investigations of human 
nature. Even worse, however, a further criticism of sociobiology and evolu-
tionary psychology emphasizes how they may unintentionally provide ideo-
logical ammunition to cultural and political conservatives who try to justify 
inequalities among human beings by appeal to differences in their biology. 
Fascism was only the most extreme and morally disastrous expression of this 
social-Darwinian way of thinking. This exhibits the dangers involved in 
providing any conception of human nature: Whether intentionally or not, 
any account of human nature courts the danger of being exploited in such a 
way that it serves to provide ideological justifications for certain unequal 
social and political relations in a society. Social constructionists and feminists 
have often made strong criticisms of naturalistic investigations of human 
nature along these lines.8 Not only do such investigations fail to do justice to 
the reflective and self-interpreting character of the phenomena they set out 
to explain, they may also unwittingly (and, on occasions in the past, with full 
complicity!) provide ideological justifications for oppressive political policies 
and practices. The problem for the more radical social constructionists and 
feminists who make these criticisms, however, is that they tend to overem-
phasize the plasticity of our acquired, second nature at the expense of our 
biological, first nature. Although human beings are no doubt much influ-
enced by their sociocultural environment, they are not so plastic as to be able 
to totally transcend their biology. 
With regard to human nature, then, we are faced with a dilemma. One 
horn is the reductionistic spirit of full-blown biological investigations of 
human nature that fail, however, to account for the reflective character of 
human beings; the other horn is the tendency on the part of various post-
modernists to overemphasize the plasticity of human nature without doing 
justice to its biological basis. Are we compelled therefore in the face of this 
 
7  John Dupré, Human Nature and the Limits of Science (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001).  
8  Cf. Alison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Lanham: Rowman & Little-
field, 1983); Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (London: Routledge, 1990). 
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dilemma to abandon any attempt to work out a conception of human na-
ture? 
II 
I submit that the ability to use language should belong at the very least to a 
tenable philosophical anthropology, i.e., one that is self-conscious of the 
ideological pitfalls and dangers of conceptions of human nature. Put sche-
matically, my line of reasoning for this claim is as follows: 
(I) Being fully human, i.e., in contrast to being merely biologically hu-
man, requires that an entity satisfy the conditions of personhood. (1) One of 
the necessary conditions of personhood is that persons be interpreted as 
mostly rational. (2) Another necessary condition for personhood is the capac-
ity to evaluate our first-order desires in terms of higher-order desires or con-
siderations; this capacity expresses the distinctive sort of self-consciousness that 
is central to personhood.  
(II) In order for (I) to be possible at all, a person must speak and under-
stand a language (i.e., must be a zoon logon echon). Put more strongly, our 
existence as linguistic animals fundamentally transforms our dealings with 
our environment in such a way that we necessarily live and move in the 
linguistic dimension, and hence in a world, rather than in a merely natural 
environment.  
(I) What is special about the status of personhood, such that being a per-
son is distinguishable from being merely biologically human? Although we 
tend in ordinary language to use these terms coextensively, there are circum-
stances when we hesitate to identify the concept of a person with that of a 
merely biological human. Thus, we may want to ascribe personhood, on the 
one hand, to creatures not sharing our biological makeup, e.g., to those 
possibly inhabiting distant planets and visiting us on earth one day; on the 
other hand, we have some hesitations about treating certain groups of hu-
man beings, e.g., infants or the mentally impaired, as full-fledged persons.9 
These thoughts bring out the way in which being a person involves the ac-
 
9  Note that it does not follow from this thought that we are therefore entitled to treat 
them as mere things either with which we may do as we wish. But it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to address this issue here. 
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quisition of a certain moral-legal and, less obviously, ontological standing, not 
the actualization of a specific biological system. What follows in this section 
can be understood as a clarification of the ontological standing or “way of 
being” of being a person, which is surely related to, but also distinct from, 
his or her moral-legal standing. 
(1) In what sense exactly is rationality one of the necessary conditions of 
personhood? It is very important first to clarify the sort of rationality in 
question, for it is neither purely instrumental nor fully discursive, though 
both of these kinds of rationality are already in some sense in play. Rather, 
the sort of rationality in question only concerns the holistic constraints on 
belief and desire ascription; to give it a label, we could call this “interpretive 
rationality” in the sense in which Davidson and Dennett conceive it.10 It 
concerns the nature and status of the constraints that hold of our attempts in 
intentional explanation to make sense of the behavior of something by as-
cribing beliefs and desires to it. Focusing on interpretive rationality in par-
ticular enables us to examine, without begging important questions, just 
what it is about (the behavior of) an entity that distinguishes it as possibly 
meriting the status of personhood. For it is uninformative and simply dog-
matic, on the one hand, to stipulate that all and only biological humans are 
persons, which would be a “speciesist” prejudice;11 on the other hand, there 
remains the need to specify just what it is that persons are – more precisely, 
what it is that they can do – such that we are entitled to claim that they are 
fundamentally different from non-persons. The suggestion is that the exami-
nation of the nature of interpretive rationality is a helpful step toward clari-
fying this issue. 
What, then, does the exercise of interpretive rationality involve? In mak-
ing sense of the behavior of something by means of giving intentional expla-
nations or predictions, we must implicitly ascribe countless other relevant 
beliefs and desires that serve as the background against which the beliefs and 
 
10  Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984), Essays 9-11, 13-14; Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems”, in: Brainstorms: 
Philosophical Essays in Mind and Psychology (Cambridge/MA: MIT Press, 1981) and 
“True Believers”, in: The Intentional Stance (Cambridge/MA: MIT Press, 1987). 
11  Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: New York Review Book/Random House, 
1990), p. 6: “‘Speciesism’, by analogy with racism, […] is a prejudice or attitude of 
bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of 
members of others.”  
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desires under examination are identified and individuated, i.e., given con-
tent.12 For a necessary condition of identifying the content of a belief is that 
it be specified against a pattern of background collateral beliefs. But this 
pattern that we ascribe must be assumed to be mostly true by our lights, for 
otherwise the entire process of interpretation could not even get started. In 
order for the process of interpretation to be possible at all, then, we must 
assume a working background of mostly common beliefs (and desires). This 
necessary assumption regarding the process of interpretation puts significant 
constraints on the degree to which we can and should ascribe false or irra-
tional beliefs to what we are interpreting.13 This is the point of Davidson’s 
and in effect Dennett’s well-known, but also often misunderstood, “principle 
of charity”. To put the thought in a more ontological vein, if something is 
going to be an object of interpretation at all, it must be mostly rational, i.e., a 
believer of mostly true and coherent beliefs. 
Now, what is relevant for our purposes here is that the holistic constraint 
of belief-desire ascription, and its necessary application of the principle of 
charity, apply straightforwardly to persons. For nothing can count as a candi-
date person, i.e., an “intentional system” in Dennett’s sense, let alone a full-
fledged person, unless it is subject to the constraint of interpretive rationality 
as required by “the constitutive ideal of rationality”14 or “the intentional 
stance”.15 Obviously, this does not imply at all that all persons are in fact 
rational on every particular occasion – surely not. Rather, the thought is that 
unless we interpret and understand something as subject to the intentional 
stance or the constitutive ideal of rationality, it could not show up or manifest 
itself as a rational-intentional entity at all. Treating it as being mostly rational 
is a conditio sine qua non of treating it as a candidate person at all. 
(2) What is required, then, for an intentional system to count as a full-
fledged person? The answer is that it must also have the capacity to evaluate 
 
12  For the sake of simplicity, only the case of belief will be discussed here. 
13  Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, op. cit., p. 168: “It isn’t that [the 
ascription of] any one false belief necessarily destroys our ability to identify further be-
liefs, but that the intelligibility of such identifications must depend on a background 
of largely unmentioned and unquestioned true beliefs. To put it another way: the 
more things a believer is right about, the sharper his errors are. Too much mistake 
simply blurs the focus.” 
14  Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 
223. 
15  Dennett, “Intentional Systems”, op. cit. 
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its first-order desires in terms of higher-order desires or considerations.16 It is 
the exercise of this capacity for evaluation that really exhibits a candidate 
person as self-conscious. Second-order desires are ones whose aim is the hav-
ing (or not) of certain first-order desires; third-order desires or considerations 
are ones whose aim is the having (or not) of certain second-order desires, and 
so on. For example, I can have the second-order desire that I not satisfy my 
first-order desire to smoke cigarettes because doing so damages my health. 
But I may also have a third-order desire that is an evaluation about whether 
it is in turn good to hold the second-order desire in question, e.g., always 
refraining from smoking for the sake of my health. Thus, I may resolve upon 
reflection that to be always slavishly assessing everything I wish to do in 
terms of its effects on my health goes against, at least on certain occasions, 
the greater worth that I may place (all in moderation, of course) on living a 
life of pleasure that is of higher value for me, even if it may, when done to 
excess, damage my health. In addition, the capacity to consider higher-order 
desires can clearly take into account and have as their aims the desires that 
other people can have (e.g., my wish to get you to believe that I have given 
up smoking so that you think me a healthier person, etc.). Evidently, this 
capacity to consider, evaluate, and realize one’s lower-order desires as a con-
sequence of evaluating and realizing higher-order ones can become quite 
complicated and sophisticated, not to mention sometimes duplicitous and 
manipulative.17 
What is significant in any case is that nothing can count as a full-fledged 
person unless it can evaluate its desires in this manner, and insofar as non-
human animals, infants, or mentally impaired human beings are not able to 
engage in this sort of evaluation of their appetitive or affective propensities, 
they are not (yet) fully persons. Something that can evaluate its desires in 
such a higher-order way is evidently self-conscious, for it can not only reflect 
upon what desires it ought to satisfy, but also become aware that it is satisfy-
ing (or refraining from satisfying) its appetitive and affective propensities on 
the basis of reasons. In other words, it has, through the exercise of this capac-
 
16  Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, reprinted in: 
The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988); Charles 
Taylor, “What is Human Agency?”, reprinted in: Human Agency and Language: Phi-
losophical Papers 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985).  
17  This is another pervasive aspect of the human condition that Rousseau already vividly 
discerns; see n. 3 above. 
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ity, made the transformation from an intentional system to a full-fledged 
person, a self-consciously reflective and responsible agent. 
(II) Now, if nothing counts as a full-fledged person unless (1) it can be 
interpreted as mostly rational and (2) capable of engaging in higher-order 
evaluations of her or his appetitive and affective propensities, it must be able 
to speak and understand language. The best way I know how to begin to make 
sense of this claim is with Sellars’s conception of what he (rather mislead-
ingly) calls “psychological nominalism”. This view holds that 
all awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short, all awareness of abstract entities – 
indeed, all awareness even of particulars – is a linguistic affair. According to it, not even 
the awareness of such sorts, resemblances, and facts as pertain to so-called immediate 
experience is presupposed by the process of acquiring the use of a language.
18
 
In other words, Sellars is making the strong claim that knowing how to use a 
language is a necessary condition of the distinctive sort of awareness, viz. 
classificatory or conceptual awareness, that we humans enjoy. To put the 
claim even more baldly: For us persons, all awareness of anything, even in 
“immediate experience”, must be linguistically mediated. 
The justification of “psychological nominalism” turns on the interde-
pendence of the holistic and normative character of conceptual awareness. In 
order to count as applying a concept, one must not only have an understand-
ing of what makes its application in a situation right, but also a sense of what 
would count as applying it wrongly. The merely reliable and discriminate 
dispositions to respond to the environment that systems like radars, eleva-
tors, or parrots can display are insufficient for counting as genuinely concep-
tual activities, because conceptual awareness involves more than just reacting 
in a regular, differential way to environmental stimuli.19 What is necessary 
for conceptual awareness is the recognition of something as instantiating a 
certain feature or property. If something is to count as applying a concept, it 
must also have an implicit grasp of some other concepts that contrast in 
content with it. It would have to understand, e.g., that one applies the con-
cept of apple correctly not with respect to its size or weight, but to its being a 
 
18  Wilfrid Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, reprinted in: Science, 
Perception and Reality (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1991), § 29, p. 160, emphases in the 
original.  
19  Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge/MA: Harvard UP, 1994), esp. ch. 4, 
pp. 213-229.  
114 Koo 
 
fruit of a certain sort. Notice that not just any set of contrastive concepts will 
do; someone who thought that the concept of weight is the appropriate con-
trastive concept of apple could not be judged to have real mastery of the 
concept of apple. A concept that floats free of its embeddedness within any 
semantic field that makes it determinate cannot be said to be a concept at all, 
for it would have no determinate range of application.20 
From another angle: Consider the case of chimpanzee behavior.21 It has 
been well documented that chimpanzees can not only learn to respond relia-
bly and discriminately to signs, but display signs on their own to express 
what they want. Here we seem to have prima facie a difficult case because we 
have creatures that display behavioral evidence of creativity in the use of 
signs, which is in turn evidence for something like thought or intention. But 
what distinguishes the chimp’s dealings with signs from those of a human 
being who has mastered a language is that “getting it right or wrong” in the 
case of the chimp is itself determined in terms of some non-linguistically 
specified task or result (e.g., the chimp sees the sign for getting the banana and 
thereupon successfully performs this task). By contrast, the rightness or 
wrongness that a human being who has mastered a language manifests in her 
understanding and use of signs cannot itself be adequately explained in this 
non-linguistic way. Rather, the sort of normativity in question here can only 
be made intelligible in terms of the use of other relevant symbols; it cannot 
be reductively explained in terms of some non-linguistic phenomena.22 For 
what is unavailable to the chimp is precisely the set of appropriately contras-
tive symbols (concepts) that renders the application of a symbol (concept) 
determinately contentful in its elicited and explicit judgments about things. 
An entity that can be aware of itself and its environment in this concep-
tual manner acquires and lives within the linguistic dimension: Such an entity 
is “sensitive to irreducible forms of rightness in the [symbols] it deploys”.23 
 
20  Cf. Sellars’s point that “one can have the concept of green only by having a whole 
battery of concepts of which it is one element” and the context in which he argues for 
it; see Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, op. cit., § 19, p. 148. 
21  I owe this example and its discussion to Charles Taylor, “The Importance of Herder”, 
in: Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge/MA: Harvard UP, 1995), pp. 83-87; cf. 
idem., “Language and Human Nature” and “Theories of Meaning”, in: Human 
Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1, op. cit. 
22  The program of behaviorism and its demise illustrate this point quite vividly.  
23  Taylor, “The Importance of Herder”, op. cit., p. 84. 
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Its linguistic, and hence conceptual, mode of intentionality realizes and 
expresses what Herder calls “reflective awareness” (Besonnenheit).24 On this 
expressivist conception of language, one cannot properly learn and use a 
word, and hence make elicited or explicit judgments, unless one is already 
situated within a medium of holistic and normatively articulated significance: 
[Reflective awareness] is defined by the capacity to focus on objects by recognizing them, 
and thus creates, as it were, a new space around us. Instead of being overcome by the ocean 
of sensations as they rush by us, we are able to distinguish one wave, and hold it, in clear, 
calm attention. It is this new space of attention, of distance from the immediate instinctual 
significance of things, which Herder wants to call reflection.
25
 
Speaking and understanding a language is thus the necessary condition of 
possibility of reflective awareness, which discloses the linguistic dimension in 
its full significance; the linguistic dimension is the indispensable medium or 
background that makes possible our distinctively conceptual way of being 
directed at the world. So conceived, language has the character of a web: 
[It is] present as a whole in any one of its parts. To speak is to touch a bit of the web, and 
this makes the whole resonate. Because the words we use have sense only through their 
place in the whole web, we can never in principle have a clear oversight of the implications 
of what we say at any moment. Our language is always more than we can encompass; it is 
in a sense inexhaustible.
26
 
Moreover, using a language and hence availing ourselves of the articulacy 
that it provides enables us to experience the range of typically human ways of 
acting and feeling emotions, of establishing and sustaining the quality and 
character of the rapports among persons, and, indeed, of what it is to be a 
full-fledged self. Language in this sense is not only the medium of reflective 
awareness, but shapes, now in a more culturally specific way, how human 
beings make sense of the world and themselves.27 
But one should not be misled into thinking that one is in this way “a 
prisoner of language”, as some poststructuralists or postmoderns would have 
it. For using language is just as much “a form of activity in which, through 
 
24  Johann Gottfried Herder, Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache (Stuttgart: 
Reclam, 1986). 
25  Taylor, “The Importance of Herder”, op. cit., p. 88, emphases added. 
26  Ibid., p. 96. Taylor appropriates this image of language as a web from Humboldt. 
27  See esp. Taylor, “Theories of Meaning”, op. cit.  
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expression, reflection is realized. Language, as Humboldt puts it, has to be 
seen as speech activity, not as work already done: as energeia, not ergon”.28 
That is, one must not reify the linguistic dimension as some sort of supra-
individual entity that hovers mysteriously and ominously above and beyond 
the linguistic-conceptual activities of human beings. It does not fully deter-
mine, but rather conditions as enabling constraints, the reflective awareness of 
human beings. Furthermore, because it is not a distinct entity over and 
above the activities of individual human beings, it must be constantly recon-
stituted and sustained through the ongoing use and thereby actualization of 
language by their speakers. In so doing, users of language can alter and re-
shape the web of language. There is an interdependent relation between re-
flective awareness and the use of language. 
In summary, when Sellars’s psychological nominalism is coalesced with 
Taylor’s elaboration of what it is to be in the linguistic dimension in its full 
significance, being a linguistic animal involves the actualization of  
a pattern of activity by which we express/realize a certain way of being in the world, that 
which defines the linguistic dimension; but the pattern can be deployed only against a 
background which we can never fully dominate. It is also a background we are never fully 
dominated by, since we are constantly reshaping it. Reshaping without dominating it, or 
being able to oversee it, means that we never fully know what we are doing to it. In rela-
tion to language, we are both makers and made.
29
 
To be and move in the linguistic dimension through our reflective awareness 
is thus to constitute a realm of conditioned freedom, i.e., a realm within which 
 
28  Taylor, “The Importance of Herder”, op. cit., p. 97. 
29  Ibid. Consider the following resonance between Sellars and Taylor on the significance 
of learning and using language. Sellars writes: “if there is a logical dimension in which 
other empirical propositions rest on observation reports, there is another logical dimen-
sion in which the latter rest on the former” (Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy 
of Mind”, op. cit., § 37, p. 170, my emphasis). This is in one sense the central and 
culminating point of “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. I have in effect been 
trying to show that this other logical dimension on which observation reports rest, 
namely, the space of reasons and the significance of being placed in it, is precisely the 
linguistic dimension that Taylor has worked to articulate in his own way. I think this 
shows the underlying influence of Hegel and the later Wittgenstein on both. In so do-
ing, Sellars and Taylor, on this reading, put us finally in the position to understand 
and appreciate Gadamer’s rather dark and alarming claim that: “Sein, das verstanden 
werden kann, ist Sprache” (Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode [Tübingen: 
Niemeyer, 1990], p. 478). 
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there is no antinomy between being conditioned by our linguistic heritage 
(tradition) and being equipped to exercise one’s freedom and creativity pre-
cisely in speaking a language.30 It is being at home in this linguistic dimension 
of conditioned freedom, actualized in reflective awareness, that truly distinguishes 
human beings (persons) from non-linguistic animals and other intentional sys-
tems. McDowell, following Gadamer, also expresses this line of thought by 
arguing that only linguistic animals can have a world (Welt), whereas non-
linguistic animals can only have an environment (Umwelt).31 Being and living 
in the linguistic dimension, as discussed above in (2), equips linguistic ani-
mals with the capacity for higher-order evaluations of their appetitive and 
affective propensities. They are not solely driven by the biological propensi-
ties of their animal mode of existence, but can effect and maintain a “free, 
distanced orientation” toward their environment and themselves. This com-
portment both realizes and expresses their second nature, which at the same 
time is interdependent with acquiring and sustaining a world.32 By learning 
and using a language, linguistic animals acquire reflective awareness: They 
come to live and move within a world within which all entities show up as 
what they are, i.e., manifest themselves under determinate aspects that can 
be considered (thematized) in many other respects. They thus exist within a 
new space of conditioned freedom within which to cope with entities and 
states of affairs in terms of significance, not only biological propensities.  
III 
Now, how does one demonstrate the necessity of using language for what it is 
to be fully human? I submit that showing this requires the use of transcen-
dental arguments.33 In what follows I will sketch their argumentative structure 
and then discuss their various distinctive features. In so doing, I suggest that 
 
30  Robert Brandom, “Freedom and Constraint by Norms”, in: American Philosophical 
Quarterly 16 (1979), pp. 187-196. The title of this paper expresses precisely the idea 
of conditioned freedom that is also expressed in the Taylor passage just cited. 
31  John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge/MA: Harvard UP, 1996), pp. 115-
119; cf. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, op. cit., pp. 442-460, esp. pp. 447-449. 
32  McDowell, Mind and World, op. cit., Lecture IV. The expression ‘free, distanced 
orientation’ comes from Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, op. cit., p. 448.  
33  Cf. Jeff Malpas (ed.), From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the Idea of the Transcen-
dental (London: Routledge, 2003). 
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we must reject or seriously qualify the widespread but mistaken assumption 
that transcendental arguments must be committed to a very strong concep-
tion of the subject that can supposedly serve as the ultimate origin and 
source of the intelligibility of everything else. 
What, then, is exactly a transcendental argument? How does it argue to 
its conclusion? As a first approximation, such an argument begins with the 
premise that some putatively undeniable mode of our intentionality (e.g., 
self-consciousness, thought, experience, knowledge, language, communica-
tion, rationality, etc.) is indeed actualized, and then argues to the conclusion 
that this mode of intentionality must have certain features or a certain struc-
ture, for otherwise this mode of intentionality could not be actualized in the 
way that it is. If this line of argument is sound, someone who tried to deny 
that the mode of intentionality in question must have those determinate 
features or that determinate structure would be committed to denying the 
very existence, intelligibility, or possibility of that putatively undeniable 
mode of intentionality. Such a consequence would be unsustainable, for he 
would be effectively denying what is undeniable; in this sense he would turn 
out to contradict himself. 
Put schematically, transcendental arguments manifest the following in-
terrelated features: 
(1) They claim to reveal the necessary conditions of the possibility of 
various modes of intentionality, such that, absent the satisfaction of these 
conditions, these modes of intentionality are not intelligible or actualizable 
at all. What distinguishes transcendental arguments is that they attempt to 
show this by establishing an interdependent – and in this sense constitutive – 
relationship between various modes of intentionality (gloss: Erkenntnisweisen) 
and the modes of being (gloss: Seinsweisen) of that at which they are directed.34 
As Kant, provocatively, claims: “die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfah-
rung überhaupt sind zugleich Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände 
der Erfahrung”.35 In short, the use of transcendental arguments (if sound) 
makes intelligible a distinctive sort of philosophizing that integrates epistemo-
 
34 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Hamburg: Meiner, 1993): “Ich nenne alle 
Erkenntnis transzendental, die sich nicht sowohl mit Gegenständen, sondern mit unse-
rer Erkenntnisart von Gegenständen, insofern diese a priori möglich sein soll, überhaupt 
beschäftigt.” (B 25, emphases in the original; cf. A 11-12 and B 117). 
35  Ibid., A 158/B 197, emphases in the original. 
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logical and ontological considerations in an interdependent-constitutive manner.  
(2) The conclusions of such arguments are neither analytically nor em-
pirically established, but synthetic propositions that are justified a priori. 
Such propositions are not analytic because their truth is not established in 
virtue of the analysis of the implicit meanings of the concepts in question; 
nor are they empirical because they cannot be inductively justified by re-
course to our past and present experience of the world. Rather, synthetic a 
priori propositions are justified by way of reflection upon the necessary condi-
tions that make some pervasive and undeniable mode of intentionality pos-
sible at all.36 
(3) The sort of necessity claimed by transcendental arguments has a deli-
cate status. On the one hand, such arguments can show that a determinate 
structure is indispensable for the actualization of some supposedly undeni-
able phenomenon or state of affairs when those who deny this connection 
must actually presuppose the existence of that determinate structure. On the 
other hand, if there are radical skeptics who challenge the reality of this 
supposedly undeniable phenomenon or state of affairs in question (e.g., self-
consciousness, thought, rationality, experience, knowledge, etc.), the propo-
nents of transcendental arguments could do little to convince such skeptics 
to abandon their radical doubts. The point is that the sort of necessity that 
transcendental arguments establish is not apodictic (unbedingt), but condi-
tional upon the prior acceptance of the supposedly undeniable existence of 
some phenomenon or state of affairs. Transcendental arguments cannot get a 
grip on someone who has radical doubts about the very existence of phe-
nomena like language, thought, communication, self-consciousness, etc.  
(4) Lastly, although analytic philosophers tend to believe that transcen-
dental arguments are best understood as directed against epistemological 
skepticism, this characterization is not really right. If the conception outlined 
above of what they show, and in particular how they show what they show, 
is correct, their real target is atomism, not in the first instance skepticism. For 
people inclined to think atomistically are precisely those who wish to deny 
the interdependence between a certain phenomenon or state of affairs and its 
necessary connection to a determinate structure that supposedly makes that 
phenomenon or state of affairs possible at all. In epistemology, the classical 
 
36  Ibid., Einleitung.  
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empiricists and their phenomenalist descendants exemplify the atomistic 
(“building-block”) way of thinking. It is therefore not surprising that phi-
losophers who reject epistemological atomism, e.g., Kant, Hegel, the later 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Sellars, or Davidson (among others), all invariably 
provide counterarguments, each in his own way, that seek to establish the 
necessarily holistic character of intentionality. 
If the sketch above of the argumentative structure and force of transcen-
dental arguments is correct, what significance does it have for the project of 
working out a tenable philosophical anthropology? The option of deriving 
the essence of human nature from putatively self-justifying a priori first 
principles is dead given our postmetaphysical sensibilities. I submit instead 
that the best and only way to justify and defend in detail any necessary as-
pects of what makes us fully human can be established only by means of 
giving transcendental arguments. I just exemplified such an argument in 
section II: (I) If being fully human requires being a full-fledged person, the 
necessary conditions of personhood require that a person be (1) interpreted 
as mostly rational and (2) self-conscious in the sense of being capable of 
engaging in higher-order evaluations of his or her lower-order appetitive and 
affective propensities. Now, if the propositions of (I) are undeniable, which I 
believe they are, (II) makes the claim that our ability to actualize (I) necessar-
ily presupposes that human beings use language in the sense of living and 
moving in the linguistic dimension. But the right to infer from (I) to (II) 
depends precisely on showing how being at home in the linguistic dimension 
is the primary necessary condition of the possibility of exercising the capaci-
ties as specified in (I).37 This condition is precisely satisfied by the acquisition 
and constant actualization of reflective (conceptual) awareness, which is what 
at once constrains and enables these capacities in general. 
Several comments are in order about the commitments of this concep-
tion of the necessity of language use for a tenable philosophical anthropol-
ogy. First, because transcendental arguments are construed above all as a 
distinctive mode of argumentation, they are not forced to be committed, e.g., 
to Kant’s transcendental idealism in all its details, at least not in particular 
with respect to his distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves 
 
37  Taylor, esp. in “Self-Interpreting Animals”, in: Human Agency and Language, op. cit., 
provides just such a transcendental argument for his chain of conclusions there. 
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(on an orthodox reading of this doctrine). Second, neither are transcendental 
arguments forced to be committed to a hyper-strong conception of the sub-
ject qua the origin and source of the intelligibility of everything. As, e.g., 
Davidson’s transcendental argument illustrates, though its conclusion does 
constrain in a synthetic a priori manner the relation between the subject and 
the world,38 there is no commitment to a conception of a subject that can 
arbitrarily decide how it can understand the world. In other words, the use 
of transcendental arguments, while certainly arguing for a distinctive 
constitutive relationship between the subject and the world, is not idealist in 
the way that, e.g., dogmatic idealism or radical social constructionism is. 
There is no appeal in using them to the superpowers of “the transcendental 
subject” or “the transcendental ego” as some readings of Husserl or Sartre 
would have it. Third and perhaps most importantly, if the philosophical 
anthropology outlined above is committed to some sort of essentialism about 
human nature, it is not an essentialism of the first-order kind: It does not 
argue that human beings (i.e., full-fledged persons) must instantiate a set of 
first-order properties, biological or otherwise. Rather, the kind of essential-
ism to which it is committed concerns the exercise of certain abilities or 
capacities that are required of any and all persons: It is, so to speak, an “abili-
ties- or capacities-essentialism” about human nature. But this should be seen 
as innocuous, for this sort of essentialism is of the higher-order kind, one that 
precisely makes possible the very sort of contingent, and by extension unequal 
and oppressive, differences among human beings that depend upon the 
presence of certain social or cultural circumstances, a line of diagnostic 
thought that postmodernists and feminists have discerned and emphasized.39 
In other words, the philosophical anthropology suggestively envisaged above 
actually makes conceptual room for Ideologiekritik and various critical social 
theories.40 What it does reject is the charge that an abilities- or capacities-
essentialism as such must be already committed to some tacit regime of 
ideology and oppression of human beings. 
 
38  Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, op. cit., Essay 11. 
39  Of course, it is far from innocuous that a certain configuration of social and political 
relations tends to oppress certain groups of people living in societies that exhibit those 
relations. But this use of ‘innocuous’ is caught up in quite a different language-game.  
40  See the essays in Part III of this volume. 
